A prominent issue in the internationalization of Chinese firms is that many are stateowned enterprises (SOEs) and that corporate governance in China is highly idiosyncratic. This paper identifies firm characteristics, industry effects and corporate governance mechanisms that foster internationalization. We find that Chinese crossborder mergers create shareholder value, but not more than domestic expansions.
Introduction
In 2005, Graham and Pettis asked the question: "who's afraid of CNNOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation)?" and started a media frenzy. The general perception has been that Chinese firms acquire foreign companies and assets at an alarming rate. The main issue of the internationalization of Chinese firms is that most are state-owned enterprises (SOEs); hence, internal and external corporate governance mechanisms are very different. In contrast to research in political economy and corporate governance, the literature in international business and finance often approaches the internationalization of Chinese firms more generically without accounting for the peculiarities of the Chinese governance system (Child and Rodrigues, 2005 ). An exception is the study by Cui and Jiang (2009) 
that contends that
SOEs face barriers to enter foreign markets due to local political opposition.
Our study goes beyond the distinction of SOEs and private entities and incorporates a broad range of corporate governance measures. It focuses on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of Chinese companies and hence a particular mode of entry. Apart from studying cross-border M&A, it also includes domestic transactions to analyse differences in underlying drivers and success. Only a few studies focus on outward FDI and they use aggregated data . In contrast, our study compiles firm-level data on cross-border M&A. In particular, the study tests the impact of three theoretical perspectives on the internationalization through M&A and its success. The first perspective underlines the importance of external and internal governance mechanisms and is based on the corporate governance and political economy literature. Second, by drawing on the Resource-based View, we incorporate firm specific proxies that contribute to better access to resources and capabilities, including the firm's past acquisition experience and financing capabilities. Third, industry specific effects can influence the degree and success of internationalization.
Our contribution is threefold. First, this paper extends the FDI literature by analyzing the determinants of cross-border M&A initiated by Chinese acquirers. Joint hypothesis tests confirm that not only governance mechanisms, but also firm-and industry-specific factors affect the decision to acquire foreign assets. Second, this paper adds to the international diversification literature by analyzing the determinants and performance of Chinese crossborder acquirers. In particular, it supports recent evidence on the internationalization of emerging market multinationals (Aybar and Ficici, 2009) by showing that Chinese crossborder M&As do not create more shareholder value than domestic transactions. For domestic M&A, these results also add to the limited but growing literature on Chinese M&A performance. Third, with regard to the corporate governance literature, in particular for emerging markets multinationals, the paper identifies governance mechanisms with explanatory power: the decision to acquire foreign assets is negatively affected by state ownership and positively by the separation of the positions of CEO and chairman of the board. The latter governance mechanism also influences the success of M&A. In addition, corporate transparency measured by disclosure of executives' compensation and issuing shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (H-shares) enhances M&A performance.
The paper is structured as follows. The second section develops the conceptual framework, followed by the development of hypotheses in Section 3. The fourth section discusses the dataset and construction of variables. Section 5 reports and discusses the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.
The conceptual framework
Cui and Jiang (2009) conduct a survey of 138 Chinese firms and determine whether firms choose joint ventures or wholly owned subsidiaries to enter foreign markets. While they survey firms that internationalized, we focus on the first step, whether firms internationalize and how successful they are in doing this. Our study refers to M&A and thus ignores greenfield investments, which is due to two reasons. First, before the start of our sample period (in 1999), 83% of all FDI was conducted through M&A (UNCTAD, 2000, p.14) .
Hence, the decision to internationalize overlaps with the decision to acquire foreign targets.
Second, there is no reliable data source that identifies greenfield investments. As pointed out by Cui and Jiang (2009) 
Development of hypotheses
Recent research on the success of diversification through internationalization paints a rather bleak picture for shareholders. find that internationally and geographically dispersed US firms experience a significant valuation discount. This effect is especially pronounced for diversifications via M&A. This stands in contrast to Gande et al. (2009) , who contend that valuation levels of US firms increases with global diversification. As a possible explanation for the contrasting results, Doukas and Kan (2006) argue that the global diversification discount may only apply to shareholders, whereas bondholders benefit from risk-reduction. Particularly for multinationals from emerging markets, Aybar and Ficici (2009) Firm specific drivers of internationalization can be based on the Resource-based View, which propounds that firms can attain competitive advantage if they possess resources not held by others (Wernerfelt, 1984) . Amit and Schoemaker (1993) regard resources as the first step in the value chain and the driver of capabilities, competencies and competitive advantage.
3 An exception is Cui and Jiang (2009) , who select a strategic behaviour approach to model the mode of entry of Chinese firms. Our focus, however, is on drivers of M&A internationalisation and cross-border merger success.
In contrast to resources, capabilities are firm-specific (Barney et al., 2001 In the merger literature there is ample evidence that corporate and public governance mechanisms affect cross-border merger activity and success (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Weitzel and Berns, 2006) . For Chinese FDI, Luo et al. (2010) use a political economy view to assess the impact of policy changes on outward FDI. It is also important to account for regional disparities in terms of external governance, for the quality of institutions differs substantially within China (Fan & Wang, 2004) . In China, corporate governance is a key issue for shareholders, as fraud and tunnelling are widespread (Gao and Kling, 2008a) . Zhang (2007) argue that relying on the market mechanism is not sufficient to enhance corporate governance Apart from firm specific resources and capabilities, the industry structure has a profound impact on internationalization (Yip, 1992) . In addition, corporate governance in China is partially industry-specific (i.e. protected industries). Accordingly, we derive the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 6. Industry-specific effects determine the propensity to conduct cross-border
M&A.
Hypothesis 7. The success of cross-border and domestic M&A depends on industry-specific effects.

Data and definition of variables
The M&A data refers to the Thomson Reuters Financial M&A database (SDC database). We refine the dataset to include only: (1) for the three day period around the announcement date (-1,+1).
(1)
Here, CAR_1 i is acquirer i's cumulated abnormal return, winsorized between 5% and 95%, r i is the stock return on acquirer i and r m is the market return of all other Chinese firms at the same stock exchange. We compute short term CARs over three days, because the fallibility of asset pricing models for the expected return r m increases with the event window (Sudarsanam, 2003) . 5 As there is no uniquely infallible model, short term event windows are less dependent on model specifications, compared to long-term windows.
The appendix contains the definition of all variables, consisting of (1) deal-related variables, (2) firm-specific variables, (3) internal and external governance measures, and (4) industry-specific effects. Deal-related variables: In line with the literature on M&A (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Sudarsanam, 2003) , we control for a number of transaction-specific variables. The method of payment can influence the success of M&A, for cash mergers are regarded as positive signals (Tichy, 2001) . Therefore, we indicate whether a transaction has been primarily a cash merger defined as 90% cash offer compared to the total offer price (cash). M&A transactions are classified based on whether the acquirer takes control (merger), acquirers an additional equity stake after taking control (acq) or buys a minority stake (min). Moreover, we distinguish between horizontal (hor) and vertical mergers based on two-digit SIC codes of acquirers and targets. The relative size of the deal (rel_size) is a key indicator of M&A success and of the propensity to conduct M&A (Moeller et al., 2004) . Finally, we account for tender offers (tend) and the reasons for selling a target firm to an acquirer, namely divestitures (divest) and privatisations (privat).
Firm-specific variables:
We account for the size of the acquirer (size) as a proxy for access to resources and the capability to allocate resources (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992) , financial leverage as a proxy for access to finance (leverage), and profitability measured by the return on equity (ROE). High profitability indicates that acquirers possess significant competitive advantage. Apart from capabilities directly linked to the business model, one could argue that capabilities can be related to the acquisition process. Acquirers with a track record of past acquisitions measured by the number of transactions (active) and previously 5 For robustness we also ran the analyses reported in this paper with CARs for different event windows, namely CAR (-1;0) and CAR(0;+1). The results are qualitatively similar with varying significances.
purchased goodwill relative to total assets (good) might develop M&A specific capabilities that could make future M&A more likely and successful. To control for a potential misvaluation effect, the study incorporates the acquirer's valuation level measured by Tobin's Q (tobin_q). Dong et al. (2006) show that there is a negative relation between acquirer's overvaluation and stock market reactions after acquisitions. (Hartzell et al., 2004) . To measure ownership concentration, we compute the Herfindahl index, defined as the squared sum of share ownership of the ten largest shareholders. To obtain a standardized measure of concentration, we subtract the lowest measured index in the sample from each observation's index and divided the outcome by the difference of the highest and lowest index in the sample. The standardized Herfindahl index (HI) provides values in the range of zero (no concentration) and one (highest concentration). Bai et al. (2004) argue that firms that issued both A-shares and B-shares (or H-share) exhibit better corporate transparency and higher market valuation, as they have to adopt dual reporting procedures. Hence, we include two dummy variables for firms that issue B-or Hshares (b_share, h_share). An effective board should enhance firm's transparency and monitoring. In general, the board's efficiency depends on its size and independence. Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) argue that a small board (board) is more effective. The independence of the board depends on the ratio of independent board members (independent) and whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board (duality). Further, the disclosure of top executives' salaries (disclosure) also reveals a board's attitude towards transparency. To account for regional disparities in the external governance environment, we use Fan and Wang's (2004) regional market function index. The index quantifies the degree of development of the regional legal system, enforcement and intermediary organizations (i.e.
accounting firms and the media) (legal).
Results and discussion
Descriptive analysis
Chinese firms exhibit some interesting peculiarities not only concerning corporate governance but also their M&A activities. In contrast to other developed or emerging markets, we do not observe more than one bidder for a target firm. In addition, only eight transactions were regarded as hostile and only one merger could be classified as distressed merger. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample highlighting the number and type of transactions, method of payment, state involvement, deal volumes, and measures of success.
(Insert Table 1 Value weighted CARs are lower than equally weighted measures; thus, larger deals are less successful, which is in line with evidence from developed markets (Moeller et al., 2005) . Most notably, concentration of ownership measured by the Herfindahl index (HI) declined over time, which also illustrates the reduction of state ownership. Managers' shareholding (own_share) has been traditionally low in China and does not seem to exhibit any long-term trend. The ratio of independent members of the board of directors (independent) showed a steady increase from 2% to 33%, which has been driven by government legislation requesting that at least a third of board members need to be independent. 7 The size of the board (board) increased until 2004 but declined thereafter, which would support the view that internal governance improved, for large boards are commonly believed to be less effective (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996) . Another indication about the improvement of the board's effectiveness is the increase in the duality measure. Duality indicates whether the two positions, CEO and chairman of the board, are held by different people. The disclosure of the 6 The values for the US and UK originate from the same database and are generated with queries that are analogous to the Chinese sample in this study.
salaries of top executives (disclose) became more common over time; in fact most acquirers disclose this information since 2007. This pattern reflects a change in policy. At the beginning of our investigation period, disclosure of executives' salaries was voluntary. Due to the lack of voluntary disclosure, the government decided to change its guidelines and made it a mandatory requirement (at least to disclose the sum of salaries but not the individual salaries).
In spite of becoming a mandatory item, some companies do not disclosure managers' compensation. Issuing B or H-shares (B-share, H-share) has become less relevant over time.
Due to tighter regulations, companies that issue B and H-share have to follow more rigorous guidelines in terms of disclosure. On the aggregated level, the external regional governance environment remained almost unchanged (legal).
(Insert Table 2 ) Studenmund, 1992) . Thus, multicollinearity is not an issue.
(Insert Table 3 )
Cross-border versus domestic M&A activity
Based on our hypotheses, we employ the firm-specific variables related to the Resource-based View and the governance variables to analyse the propensity to conduct cross-border M&A (Hypotheses 2 and 4). In addition, we account for industry-specific effects in line with Hypothesis 6. Because of the binary nature of the dependent variable, namely to internationalize through M&A or not (cross), we apply a probit model, which takes the following form.
(1
Apart from using industry dummies (D j ), the probit model also includes year dummies (D k ) to control for a potential time effect, which might be driven by general policy or macroeconomic changes. The probit model refers to maximum likelihood estimation with heteroskedasticity-consistent variance estimation. Table 4 shows the results.
(Insert Table 4 Testing the importance of the Resource-based View for the decision to internationalize through M&A (Hypothesis 2) implies the null-hypothesis that all firm-specific proxies linked to resources and capabilities are equal to zero (H 0 :  1 =…= 5 =0), which can be tested using an F-test. Besides testing the joint hypothesis, we can reveal individual variables that affect
internationalization. Hypothesis 4 is tested in a similar manner. Next to the three probit specifications, Table 4 Acquirers that are more likely to enter foreign markets conduct fewer acquisitions (active) prior to market entry but exhibit higher goodwill relative to total assets (good). A high goodwill relative to total assets indicates past acquisitions, where the purchase price exceeded the target's net value of assets substantially due to intangible assets or synergies (i.e.
brand, technology). Therefore, cross-border M&A is more likely if Chinese acquirers develop experience from a few but substantial transactions with relatively high intangible assets.
These partial effects disappear in specification B and C; however, a negative impact of SOEs emerges. The discrepancy in the model can be explained by the fact that private companies exhibit significantly higher goodwill (4.0%) compared to SOEs (2.9%) and private firms acquirer fewer targets (3.0 compared to 3.4). Accordingly, the significant impact of goodwill and activity in model A is replaced by the dominant underlying factor, namely state ownership in model B and C.
In line with Cui and Jiang (2009) , Model B confirms that state-owned acquiring firms (gov) are less likely to conduct cross-border M&A. Cui and Jiang (2009) contend that this finding might be due to political opposition in the respective host country. In addition, one needs to consider that most M&A transactions are driven by the desire to restructure SOEs and not to acquire foreign assets. Based on the governance indicators, we cannot argue that better governance leads to more internationalization of Chinese firms, as the findings are mixed. Acquirers not controlled by the state (gov) and with a separation of the CEO position and the chairman of the board of directors (duality) were more likely to execute cross-border deals. These measures would indicate better internal governance. Nevertheless, acquirers that internationalized also had higher ownership concentration (HI), which is an indicator for more dominant principal shareholders. In developed markets, high ownership concentration indicates weaker governance -but the same is not necessarily true in a less developed governance environment. In particular, in China the importance of the state declines -but another class of companies with high ownership concentration emerges: business groups. If we assume that business groups are associated with better internal governance than the state, a high ownership concentration does not necessarily imply weaker governance.
Determinants of M&A success
To test Hypotheses 1, 3, 5 and 7, we need to explain the success of M&A, which includes domestic and cross-border transactions, using firm-specific proxies, industry-specific effects, and governance mechanisms. The specification of the model is similar to Equation 1, except that the dependent variable is the equally weighted cumulated abnormal return around the merger announcement (CAR_1), and that explanatory variables incorporate deal-specific characteristics. Further, in order to test Hypothesis 1, the model includes a dummy variable for Chinese target firms (ch). We estimate the following full specification with ordinary least squares and a heteroskedasticity-consistent variance estimator.
(2 ) Table 5 shows the results of different model specifications of Equation 2 and reports the joint hypothesis F-tests, which support Hypotheses 3, 5 and 7. Firm-specific variables linked to the Resource-based View (Hypothesis 3), corporate governance mechanisms (Hypothesis 5), as well as industry-specific effects (Hypothesis 7) all possess explanatory power. Due to a high number of missing values after considering governance proxies, the sample size declines. To ensure comparability and to assess the relevance of corporate governance, we specify a model with and without governance variables based on the same sample. Consequently, the model specifications D and E as well as F and G can be compared directly. Given the same number of observations, the estimated coefficients do not change substantially. Adding governance measures improves the model fit indicated by a higher adjusted R-squared.
(Insert Table 5 Model E incorporates the deal specific variables as defined in Section 4. Financial leverage and Tobin's Q remain to be significant and negative drivers of M&A success. The coefficient for the dummy for domestic mergers (ch) is not statistically different from zero, which supports Hypothesis 1. Chinese acquirers do not benefit from cross-border mergers, but they are also not worse off when compared with domestic M&As. This is in line with previous findings for cross-border mergers by emerging market multinationals (Aybar and Ficici, 2009 ). Although Chinese mergers may, on average, be value enhancing (as shown in Table 1 ), cross-border mergers do not create more value than domestic deals. Cash mergers and privatisations trigger a higher market response, but both partial impacts are only significant on the 90% level of confidence. Relative size (rel_size) has a significant positive effect on M&A success, which is counterintuitive based on empirical evidence for developed markets. However, acquisitions in China are very small, as even the largest acquisition only reaches 1.2% of the acquirer's assets. 
Conclusion
This paper analyses whether firm-, governance-, and industry-specific effects influence the decision to internationalize and whether these drivers impact on the success of M&A conducted by Chinese acquirers. By using domestic and cross-border M&A data from 4374
Chinese deals announced from 2001 to 2008, the paper contributes the following key insights:
Chinese cross-border mergers create shareholder value, but not more than domestic M&As.
We find significantly positive abnormal stock returns for Chinese mergers, both for equally weighted and value-weighted measures of success. However, in line with recent evidence on the internationalization of firms from emerging markets (Aybar and Ficici, 2009 We can confirm that (i) firm-specific determinants that are related to the Resourcebased View as well as (ii) industry-specific fixed effects do not only matter in mature economies (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) , but also for Chinese acquirers. Joint hypothesis tests clearly show the explanatory power of these two dimensions, despite the idiosyncrasies of the Chinese governance and state ownership system.
Based on these findings, we can formulate the following recommendations for managers and policy makers: (1) improving internal and external governance mechanisms is vital to promote internationalization and to enhance the value creation potential from M&A;
(2) Chinese firms need to focus on maintaining a moderate level of financial leverage to ensure easy access to resources, which in turn supports value creation from M&A. The latter recommendation might change if capital markets develop further (i.e. market for corporate bonds), payment in stock becomes more common, or state imposed restrictions on borrowing are abolished. Note: all correlation coefficients larger than |0.05| are statistically significant at the 1% level. 261.87*** 0.000 Year effects 31.33*** 0.000 Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator of variance; year and industry (2-digit SIC) fixed effects included. 
